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Hezbollah’s Military Intervention in Syria
Political choice or religious obligation?
Hezbollah has been an important political and military actor in Lebanon and the Middle East since the mid-1980s. Its popularity grew especi-
ally after successfully deterring the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 2006. With the emergence of the so-called 
Arab Spring, however, the party’s popularity declined 
for many reasons. One of these was its military inter-
vention in Syria on the side of the Syrian government. 
This event has been interpreted in various ways, some-
times explaining it as religiously-motivated decision, 
due to Hezbollah’s strong affiliation to Shia Islam. This 
empirical research finds that, on the contrary, Hezbol-
lah’s intervention is politically rather than religiously 
motivated. The data presented here shows that Hez-
bollah politicizes certain aspects of the religious sen-
sitivities in the region in order to mobilize troops, yet, a 
study of its military activities inside Syria indicates that 
Hezbollah actually follows its polit ical and geostrategic 
interests.
Introduction
Civil wars, like other types of war, have local, regional 
and international dimensions. Because of the inter-
connectedness of the actors in the international sys-
tem, if a civil war breaks out in one state, those neigh-
bouring, or even some international actors, might 
sense its repercussions. These foreign states may also 
play a role in the civil war as external actors. Such 
a role includes political, financial, diplomatic, mili-
tary, humanitarian and other types of support. Under 
these conditions, the civil war ceases to be a local war 
and turns out to be more international in its scope. 
In other words, the foreign involvement in a civil war 
internationalizes it.
The Syrian conflict is a recent example of an 
internationalized civil war where foreign actors have 
intervened, either on the side of the government or 
the opposition, by officially deploying troops on Syr-
ian territory. Nevertheless, what is rather special in 
the Syrian case is that those intervening are non-state 
rather than state actors. The most prominent and 
obvious example is the Lebanese Hezbollah’s inter-
vention in Syria.
Hezbollah is a non-state actor that has been pre-
sent at the political, military and religious levels in 
Lebanon and the Middle East since the 1980s. Argu-
ably, the party is a socio-political and military organ-
ization rather than a religious one, yet its strong affili-
ation to the Shia faith is evident and the majority of 
its members follow this stream of Islam. Hezbollah, 
or the Party of God, is led by the charismatic leader 
Sayeed Hasan Nasrallah, who serves as the general 
secretary of the party. Since the spring of 2013, this 
movement has established an official military pres-
ence in Syria, fighting on the side of the government. 
Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian conflict was 
a controversial event that some parties welcomed and 
others strongly condemned. Perhaps the prin cipal 
criticism that Hezbollah received was that instead 
of fighting Israel (Hezbollah’s self proclaimed pri-
mary enemy) it was (and is) killing the Syrian people 
who have supported the party for decades. Due to 
the strong Shia background of Hezbollah, the party 
was accused of inflaming sectarian violence in Syria 
by supporting the Syrian government – in which 
Alawites1 have influential positions – against a pre-
dominantly Sunni armed opposition. In the regional 
context, Hezbollah, after its intervention, was also 
blamed for bringing the war home and risking the 
Lebanese security.
1 A religious denomination within the Shia Islam.
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However, Hezbollah has rejected these accusa-
tions, claiming that on the contrary it is defending 
Syria, which is the ‘backbone of the [Iran–Syria–
Hezbollah] resistance’, as General Secretary Hassan 
Nasrallah put it (The Daily Star 2013). The party has 
also claimed that it is waging a preemptive war against 
Islamic extremists in order to hinder their expansion 
into Lebanon. The fact that Hezbollah is a socio-
political movement with a strong Shia background 
and that it is fighting Sunni extremists in Syria, pro-
vides its intervention with a religious rationale.
There is no shortage of literature on the above-
mentioned debate. There are also plenty of studies 
which cover the ideology, political and religious activ-
ities, and the historical development of Hezbollah 
and its role in the resistance bloc. At the same time, 
there is also literature available (albeit sometimes 
misleading) on the religio-political tensions between 
some Shia and the Sunni forces in the region. In that 
light, the aim of this research is not to repeat, but to 
try to understand whether Hezbollah’s intervention 
has been religiously or politically motivated.
Analytical framework 
For centuries, religion has been a crucial unit of 
analysis for gaining an understanding of the politic al 
developments in the Middle East. One key reason 
for this lies in the inseparable nature of religion and 
politics in a region where the majority of the inhab-
itants are Muslims. Even in the countries where the 
official representatives claim their states to be secular 
(such as Syria), the din wa dawla debate (concern-
ing religion and the state) pertains. Theoretically, in 
a secular political system, state and religion are sep-
arate, whereas in an Islamic state this separation is 
more difficult to achieve because the ‘legitimacy [of 
the state] derives from the application of Sharia and 
the fusion of religion and politics’ (Kalyvas 2003: 300; 
also see Karaman 2004: 45).
The Syrian political system, for instance, seems 
to occupy a position somewhere in between the sys-
tems mentioned above. While the Syrian authorities 
describe Syria as a secular state, the third article of 
the country’s 1973 constitution states that Islamic 
jurisprudence is the sole source of legislation (the 
Syrian 1973 Constitution). This article argues that 
religion and politics in the Middle East are neither 
separate nor identical; instead, these two variables 
often interact and intersect at political, social, educa-
tional, economic and other levels.
To study the research problematic in the men-
tioned context, there is a need for an analytical tool 
which carefully examines the interplay between polit-
ical and religious factors respecting the interceding 
variables between these factors. The socio-polit ical 
conflict model is an appropriate analytical tool for 
this study because it ‘argues that religion offers ideo-
logical and organizational resources, and the socio-
political forces will seek to mobilize these resources 
if the strategic situation is such that this tends to 
strengthen their position vis-à-vis their adversary’ 
(Schmidt 2009: 125).
Stathis Kalyvas (2003: 294) argues that in spite 
of the versatility of religious doctrines and socio-
political environments, religious mobilization is an 
integral phenomenon amongst religious institu-
tions. Among the key features of this kind of mobi-
lization are the recreation of religious identities and 
‘mass mobilization relying on the wide use of selec-
tive incentives and a concomitant focus on economic 
and social issues’ (Kalyvas 2003: 294). Reconstruct-
ing religious identity indicates that some religious 
institutions do not merely use the existing identities 
to mobilize but rather they recreate these identities 
in accordance with their social, economic or political 
concerns (Kalyvas 2003: 303).
Religious parties often have broad grassroots 
bases, which are critical for mass mobilization. In 
most of the cases, these religious actors ally with the 
poor and the middle classes in order to challenge the 
elite (see Labat, cited in Kalyvas 2003: 305). The reli-
gious parties, however, do not address this cause by 
means of abstract religious notions, but by providing 
actual socio-political and economic incentives such 
as social services, economic assistance and educa-
tion (Kalyvas 2003: 305). Islam, in particular, offers 
Hezbollah’s Syrian Arab Republic’s flags used by demon-
strators to illustrate the alliance between the two.
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a powerful ideology for mobil-
ization. As Maxime Rodinson 
puts it, Islam is an ideologie 
mobilisatrice (cited in Karaman 
2004: 48). Yet, it is also import-
ant to note that religious mobil-
ization does not necessarily 
follow a religious objective; it 
can deploy sacred symbols to 
serve political purposes (Smith 
1974 cited in Karaman 2004: 
43).
Currently, religious mobil-
ization is certainly a key factor 
in understanding the dynam-
ics of the conflict in the Mid-
dle East. After the ‘secular’ 
states (such as Egypt, Syria and 
Iraq) were unable to satisfy 
large portions of their societies, non-state religious 
institutions started filling some of the gaps left by the 
state authorities. The Muslim Brother hood in Egypt 
is a prominent example which initiated a social-
political- religious movement in the 1930s through 
to the 1950s (Munson 2001). The Sadr Movement 
also filled the gap left by Saddam Husain in Iraq by 
helping the poor, but also by playing a key religio-
political role in the country after the US led invasion 
(Schmidt 2009). Similarly, Hezbollah has been estab-
lished as a popular party in Lebanon which offers a 
‘way out’ for the marginalized Shia population in the 
country.
Hezbollah and religious mobilization 
Hezbollah’s establishment in 1980s is strongly asso-
ciated with, albeit not limited by, two factors: end-
ing the Israeli occupation in south Lebanon and the 
Palestinian cause. After pushing the Israeli Army out 
of Lebanon in 2000, the party achieved victory, but 
lost its raison d′etre (ICG 2003: 1). Nevertheless, the 
party quickly redefined its aims and objectives, put-
ting Palestine, the defence of Lebanon from Israeli 
aggression and preserving the resistance bloc as its 
central causes (ICG 2003: 9; ICG 2002: 4). Since Hez-
bollah has been actively present as a political party 
in Lebanon, its military wing has remained as a key 
self-defining characteristic; even a raison d′etre (Harb 
and Leeders 2005: 186).
Hezbollah follows the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih 
and in Lebanon it is the official representative of the 
Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader 
of Iran and the Wali al-Faqih (see ICG 2002: 4).2 In 
this way, the party acquires a significant Shia reli-
gious identity. Theoretically, the Wilayat ‘is necessary 
to maintain and apply Islam. It is impossible to real-
ize the great Islamic project by means of timely and 
isolated operations. [It is necessary to have] a guiding 
axis that links the umma together’ (Qassem cited in 
Harb and Leeders 2005: 191). In practical terms, this 
idea is translated into action throughout Hezbollah’s 
complex and wide-ranging socio-political network in 
Lebanon (Harb and Leeders 2005: 191).
This network of Hezbollah is crucial to its religious 
mass mobilization capability and its reconstruction 
of religious identity. Concerning the former, Hezbol-
lah manages dozens of institutions which provide 
social, economic and educational services. These 
institutions are ordered hierarchically under one 
administrative unit, called the Social Services Cen-
tral Unit (Harb and Leeders 2005: 191; Flanigan and 
Abdel-Samad 2009: 124–6) (see fig.). These services 
include charitable, financial and material support to 
rebuild the ruins of the Hezbollah–Israeli wars, as 
well as hospitals, clinics and pharmacies delivering 
reliable services and affordable prices in comparison 
to the private sector. The central unit of this organ-
ization also includes NGOs for the empowerment of 
women, a research centre for study and to offer solu-
tions to socio-economic problems that concern the 
party, as well as schools, social welfare organizations 
2 To read more about Wilayat al-Faqih see Asharq  
Al-Awsat 2009.
Figure. Adopted from Flanigan and Abdel-Samad 2009: 125.
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and religious institutions (ICG 2002: 5; Harb and 
Leeders 2005: 187–8). 
Hezbollah also provides assistance in relation to 
military affairs. It has associations such as Al-Shahid 
(the martyr) and Al-Jarha (the wounded), which man-
age schools, hospitals and ensure access to resources 
dedicated to help the families of the martyrs, the 
wounded, prisoners and missing individuals (Harb 
and Leeders 2005: 187). These few examples indicate 
that Hezbollah’s mission is not just military-political, 
but also socio-economic and religious. This practice 
of mass mobilization provides Hezbollah with wide 
support, religious and political credibility and human 
resources to achieve its aims, which may be political 
and not religious. Mass mobilization, however, is not 
the only characteristic of Hezbollah; it has a rather 
deeper and more religious/ideological mobilization 
policy portrayed via what I would consider its efforts 
at identity reconstruction.
Besides the material aspects of Hezbollah’s activ-
ities, the party also disseminates and reshapes values, 
norms and identities which produce the ‘resistance 
society’ or Mujtama’ al-Mukawama. Hence, resist-
ance does not solely have a military significance but 
also a social, political and religious one; it is a way 
of life, or a life choice (Harb and Leeders 2005: 189; 
Flanigan and Abdel-Samad 2009: 122, 126). The 
party advocates these values and norms through the 
services that it provides, including education, litera-
ture, teaching in schools such as the Imam al-Mahdi 
Institute and the Imam Khomeini Cultural Centre, 
organizing youth activities, and providing childrens 
books (Blanford 2011). Furthermore, the vice presi-
dent of the Islamic Institute for Teaching and Edu-
cation claims, for example, that the institute aims at 
‘redefining the structure of society’ (cited in Harb 
and Leeders 2005: 190).
The reconstruction of its identity also challenges the 
Shia sense of victimhood, characterized as mahrumin 
(disinherited) and mustada’afin (disempowered) and 
instead it implants a sense of pride and victoriousness 
(Harb and Leeders 2005: 189). The sense of victory 
is strengthened by Hezbollah’s achievements on the 
battlefield against Israel (with the liberation of south 
Lebanon in 2000 and the victory over Israel in 2006). 
This triumph is also advocated as being a result of 
the efforts put in by the resistance bloc countries. In 
this manner, the perception of resistance becomes a 
self-identification factor (ibid. 190), similar to other 
common self-defining and identifying factors such as 
family, religion, ethnicity and language, to name a few 
(Brubaker et al. 2004: 33).
This effort of Hezbollah in ‘redefining the struc-
ture of society’ by non-military means also has its 
justification in the religious sense. The resistance 
society that Hezbollah’s network wants to achieve is 
a form of jihad; not a military, but a spiritual jihad 
(Harb and Leeders 2005: 190; Flanigan and Abdel-
Samad 2009). Islam, contrary to the tradition-
ally accepted idea, places more importance on the 
spiritual jihad than the military jihad. The Prophet 
Mohamed explained that the military jihad is minor 
(jihad al-asghar) whereas the spiritual jihad is the 
great jihad (jihad al-akbar) (al-Ashmawi 1986: 130). 
Theoretically, the jihad in Shia Islam, however, needs 
to receive the approval of the imam who serves as the 
religious reference or al-marja’iya (Vaezi 2004: 73). 
Accordingly, the abstract notion of resistance, and 
its actual military and political practice, become fard 
shar’i or religious obligation for Shias if a religious 
leader such as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei affirms it.
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria 
Hezbollah’s decision to deploy troops in Syria 
expressed the party’s character and ideological rea-
soning. Mass mobilization and the commitment of 
Hezbollah members to the idea of resistance played 
a partial, yet important, role in carrying out Hezbol-
lah’s decision to intervene militarily in Syria. Both 
religious and political factors certainly played and 
still play a fundamental role. What is disputable, 
however, is how?
Throughout Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syr-
ian conflict, its leadership has offered various jus-
tifications. One of the first, in 2012, was related to 
the defence of Shia-populated villages inside Syria 
(Neriah 2012).3 Another of its justifications was the 
necessity of protecting religious sites from possible 
attacks by extremists. The party did not intervene 
officially to protect these sites but it also did not stop 
the volunteers who, by April 2012, had already moved 
into Syria to carry out this duty (Al-Monitor 2013). 
3 Nasrallah at this stage did not claim that there is an 
official Hezbollah presence in Syria but he ‘acknowl-
edged, however, that there were more than two dozen 
villages and farms located just inside Syria, north of 
the border with Lebanon, that are home to around 
30,000 Lebanese, many of whom are [Shias] and 
members of Hezbollah. Mr Nasrallah said that they 
‘had been coming under threat from “armed groups” 
and had chosen to defend themselves’. (Blanford 
2012) 
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The party officials further justified their party’s posi-
tion claiming that they wanted to avoid a similar scen-
ario to what had happened in Iraq after 2006 when 
Shias were victims of sectarian violence, orchestrated 
by radical extremist groups (ICG 2014: 5).
Amongst the arguments that Hezbollah offered at 
the time its involvement in Syria deepened, were ones 
about fighting what they call the takfiris – religious 
extremists who denounce others as infidels. Hezbol-
lah believes that its battles in the al-Qalamoon region, 
adjacent to Lebanon, are preemptive measures for the 
prevention of an expansion of the war into Lebanon 
(ICG 2014: 5). Nevertheless, their intervention ren-
dered the Shia community in both Syria and Lebanon 
primary targets for takfiris4. The success of groups 
such as Jabhet al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq 
and al-Sham and the fragmentation of the ‘moder-
ate’ Syrian armed opposition has served to support 
Sayeed Nasrallah’s claims. For Hezbollah, the tak-
firis also threaten the resistance allies in the region. 
Nasrallah has repeatedly referred to a conspiracy on 
the part of the US and Israel to undermine the resist-
ance, using the takfiris as instruments (Sullivan 2014: 
14; Slim 2013; Naharnet Newsdesk 2013).
Usually the terms and the practice of a jihad 
4 While writing this article, there were reports of 
clashes between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Army, 
on the one hand, and groups who claimed affiliation 
to Jabhet al-Nusra, or the Islamic State, on the other, 
in the Lebanese town of Arsal (Brog 2014). In late 
October 2014, some reporters wrote that Jabhet 
al-Nusra is also active in the coastal city of Lebanon, 
Tripoli (Nemr 2014). These developments inside 
the Lebanese territories put Hezbollah’s preemptive 
strategy against the extremist groups’ spillover into 
Lebanon under question.
becomes subject to politicization by religious lead-
ers who are closely associated with some political 
tendencies. Syria is a good example of an arena in 
which such jihad and counter-jihad statements and 
fatwas (see Tokmajyan 2014) play themselves out. 
For instance, the takfiris in Syria are in a state of mili-
tary jihad against non-believers, including Shias. This 
clears the way for Hezbollah propaganda calling for 
troop mobilization and justifying military interven-
tion. Yet, they deploy the jihad ‘card’ more carefully 
than that. Despite there is no fatwa from any credible 
regional Shia religious leaders who urge jihad in Syria 
(Mamouri 2013), which means that Shias are not 
obliged to fight in Syria, Hezbollah treats its soldiers 
who die in Syria as martyrs who died while being 
in the state of jihad. According to some reports, the 
party considered defending the religious sites in Syria 
as a religious obligation (Al-Monitor 2013). When 
Hezbollah commander Ali Hussain Nassif died near 
the Syrian-Lebanese border, Sayeed Nasrallah said 
that he died during his ‘jihad duty’ (Chulov 2012). 
Nassif ’s case is not unique, Hezbollah fighters who 
die in Syria are treated as martyrs who died while 
carrying out their duty of jihad (ICG 2014: 16).
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria is often used 
as an example which supports the common and 
reductionist narrative of a Shia–Sunni struggle in 
the Middle East that is actively advocated in the 
regional and international media. While this reli-
gious dynamic does exist in the region, there are also 
other explan ations for conflict, which are also worth 
taking into consideration. 
The geopolitical dimension of the struggle in 
Syria is crucial for Hezbollah. One of the evident 
struggles of the party in Syria is to keep its supply 
routes under control. As Marisa Sullivan (2014: 9) 
The funeral of a Hezbollah fighter.Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham fighters.
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puts it ‘Hezbollah cannot risk losing its access to 
critical Iranian and Syrian support’. For instance, 
even before the official intervention of Hezbollah, 
the party had deployed a limited number of troops 
in the al-Zabadani area near Damascus, which is a 
historical supply route from Damascus to Hezbol-
lah’s headquarters in the Bekka valley in Lebanon 
(Fulton et al. 2013: 23). There was a similar objective 
behind the battle of al-Qusayr which did not just take 
place to disturb the opposition supply line but also to 
maintain the party’s communication route between 
the Bekka valley and Damascus (Sullivan 2014: 10). 
Another example is Hezbollah’s (and other Shia mili-
tias’) commitment to protect the shrine of Sayeeda 
Zainab on the Damascus International Airport high-
way. Even though the site is a holy place, the heavy 
presence of these militias enhances the defence of 
the airport; a vital communication link to Damascus 
(Sullivan 2014: 19).
The possible change of the current Syrian gov-
ernment is also a worrying factor for Hezbollah. If 
the Syrian government were to fall, what guaran-
tee is there that the new rulers (potentially formed 
from the current opposition) would continue sup-
porting Hezbollah, especially since many opposition 
leaders condemn Iranian and Hezbollah activities 
in Syria? The worst-case scenario is domination by 
Sunni extremist forces, who have publicly declared 
their aim of eradicating the Shias (Sullivan 2014: 10). 
Accordingly, intervention in Syria becomes both a 
‘necessary evil’ and a ‘strategic necessity’ (ICG 2014: 
3–4). Furthermore, a prominent figure in the Syrian 
opposition , Haytam Manna, has repeated many times 
that Hassan Nasrallah would not support a win–lose 
situation even if the state were to win. Rather, the 
party supports a political solution (Manna 2013), 
because a political solution would possibly secure a 
way out of Syria for Hezbollah.
Finally, Hezbollah’s repeated use of the takfiri 
argument seems to be an exaggeration of the real 
situation. It is evident that not all the fighters in Syria 
are takfiris and Hezbollah leadership is well aware of 
this. When Hezbollah pledged support to the Syrian 
government and provided military support, the tak-
firi groups – mainly Jabhet al-Nusra and ISIS – were 
not as strong as they are today. In fact, Hezbollah is 
mainly located in the al-Qalamoon area where there 
are some jihadist activities, yet their stronghold is 
in the north and north east, where Hezbollah has 
no active military role.5 While it does not have any 
5 While writing this article, there were reports about 
troops in the north east of Syria, where ISIS is strong-
est, it has some presence in Aleppo. Nevertheless, 
Hezbollah’s role in Aleppo is limited to issuing mili-
tary advice and does not include active participation, 
at least not as in al-Qusayr (Sullivan 2014: 17; Jaber 
2013).
Conclusion
The destruction of the Iraqi state resulting from the 
US-led invasion in 2003 and the sectarian policies 
of the successive Iraqi governments since then have 
provided powerful justificatory arguments allow-
ing sectarian groups such as the Islamic State to rise 
to prominence on a tide of popular support. These 
reciprocal developments have led to a sectarianiza-
tion of the conflict in Iraq. The Syrian armed conflict 
also witnessed similar sectarianization following the 
events of the summer of 2013 when radical extremist 
groups dominated the scene. Hezbollah’s interven-
tion in this context can be seen as a Shia regional 
power fighting with the Syrian government against 
extremist groups who are exclusively radical Sunnis.
This view, as much as it is commonly argued and 
as much as it is convincing sometimes, remains, 
nevertheless, very reductionist. As this article has 
argued, religion plays an important role in enabling 
Hezbollah to mobilize troops and volunteers to fight 
in Syria. Hadad (2013 cited in Elliott 2014) finds that 
53 per cent of the Shia population in Lebanon is very 
religious, though they do not all follow Hezbollah. 
On the other hand, Randa Slim (2013) argues that the 
‘strong inner core of devoted [Shia] families, fighters, 
business partners, and ideological affiliates comprises 
20–30 per cent of Hezbollah’s support base’.
However, even the religiously-based mobilization 
is only part of Hezbollah’s overall tactic of mobil-
ization. As mentioned in the text, Hezbollah’s sup-
the Syrian rebels in the south ‘being the last hope of 
the west’ since they are ‘moderate’ and they reject 
radical extremism (see Al-Hayat 2014a). Accordingly, 
these groups are not categorized as takfiris whom 
Hezbollah publicly claims to fight. Yet, some reports 
document that Hezbollah forces are actually involved 
in the fights in Deraa against these ‘moderate’ rebels, 
due to Deraa province’s importance in the south-
ern front and the security of the Syrian capital (see 
Al-Hayat 2014b). This indicates that for Hezbollah it 
is more important to secure the southern borders of 
Damascus fighting the ‘moderates’ rather than fight 
the takfiris in Aleppo for example, where the party 
has only advisers and no troops.
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ported process of self-identification does not include 
only religious factors. The notion of resistance, for 
instance, forms an important element of this pro-
cess. Accordingly, even the mobilization is not based 
merely on religious factors. Hezbollah repeatedly 
refers to at least three main justifications for its inter-
vention: Shia villages and religious sites, Syria as the 
backbone of the resistance bloc and Lebanese (and 
not only Shia) security.
The second argument put forward here is that 
this mobilization of troops and intervention in Syria 
in general is geared towards maintaining the party’s 
geopolitical interests inside Syria. The empirical data 
presented above shows that Hezbollah has deployed 
soldiers in areas which are vital in the Tehran-
Damascus-Hezbollah supply line. The same data 
also illustrates that supporting the Syrian troops and 
defending its key interests in the south, for example, 
where takfiri activities are in fact limited, is also a pri-
ority for Hezbollah – a higher priority than fighting 
the takfiris in Aleppo, in the north, for example. 
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